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persons. theze indictments, for the reasn s I have stated. do not come
under the Fifteenth Amendment. If they are valid at all. to give
jurisdiction to this court it must be under the Fourteenth Amendment
and the 4th section of the Act of May 1S70. But, fur reasons already
abundantly stated, registration is a right conferred by the state. Each
of the three indictments under immediate consideration expressly recites
that the right is conferred by the laws of Virginia, and that the duties
of the registrar were duties imposed by state laws. Nor do they charge
that in consequence of the failure of the injured persons named to be
admitted to registration they lost their righ't to vote either at a state
election or an election held for officers of the United States. The
denial merely of registration is an offence against the state, if it be on
any 'other account than of race, color, &c. If the indictments had
charged that the denial had been on account of race, &c., the offence
would have been cognisable here ; or if, after charging the denial, the
indictments had gone on to charge that in consequence thereof the
citizen of the United States was prevented from voting at an election
held for a member of Congress, or electors of a President of the United
States, I am inclined to think that the offence would have been cognisable here. But a charge merely that a citize, of the United States was
denied registration, without other allegation to make it appear that
.some right was abridged which belonged to the man as a citizen of the
United States, is not sufficient to give cognisance of the offence to
'this court.
I am, therefire, of opinion that the demurrers to these indictments
-against the Petersburg registrars ought to be sustained, and that the
,latter ought to be quashed.
The judges being divided in opinion, the case will be certified to the
.Supreme Court of the United States.
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AND AWARD.

Rerocation-Jurisdictionof Curts.-It was agreed to submit all
'matters in a pending suit to referees under the Act of June 16th 1S36,
-that the submission should be made a rule of court, and bt binding
. without appeal, exception or writ of error." Held, that the award was
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in vol. 20 of his Reports.

2 From J. M. Shirley, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 53 N. H. Reports.
3 From G. D. W. Yroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 8 of his Reports.
4 From Hon. M. 31. Granger, Reporter; to appear in 24 Ohio St. Reports.
s From F. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 75 Ila. Statc Reports.
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not invalid for want of -the affidavit directed by the 2d section. The
section does not apply to a submission and rule in a pending suit: Shisler v. Zeavy, 75 Pa.

When the submission is in a pending
"(. action it need not be stipulated
that it shall be a rule of court:
On the day the award was filed, one of the parties filed a revocation
of his submission; the court below refused to set the award aside.
Hed, that it belonged to such court to correct errors as on motion for a
new trial, and the Supreme Court will not review the decision, except
as to matters appearing by the record. Neither depositions, other evidence nor the reasons of the court below are part of the record : .
After an agreement for submission has been executed neither party
can revoke it: I1.
Under an agreement for submission providing that the award shall be
final, without appeal or exception, the court cannot rectify a mistake of
fact of the referees : Id.

A submission in writing cannot be revoked except by writing given
to the referees or a majority of them : I .
ASSIGNMENT.

See Pleading.

ATTORNEY.

Withdrawal of Appearance Effect on Rights of Parties.-A withdrawal, "without prejudice to the plaintiff," of a general appearance
entered by an attorney, for the defendant, means that the position of the
plaintiff is not to be unfavorably affected by the act of withdrawal; that
all his rights are to remain as they then stood. Hence where there has
been error in the beginning of an action, as ex. gr., one of foreign attachment, by reason of want of notice required by statute to be given to
the defendant, and an attorney appears generally for such defendant,
and so cures the defect, the advantage thus given to the plaintiff is not
taken away by a withdrawal declared to be "without prejudice" to him.
And the court states that it does not intend to intimate that the result
would have been different had the appearance been withdrawn unconditionally: Creighton v. Kerr, 20 Wall.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Giving tinw to Maker-Stipulation that Endorser not to le Discharged.
-The holder of'a note agreed in writing with the drawers upon a consideration, to give them tine, with the proviso," that no delay of demand
shall interfhre with any claim I may have upon the endorsers of the
said note." Hrd, that endorsers were not discharged: ffage, v. Mill,
75 Pa.
If time be given or any act be done by the holder which prejudices
the right of the endorser to his action against the drawer or subrogation
to the rights of the holder, the endorser will be discharged : I1.
A' discharge of the debtor by the creditor will not discharge the
surety if there be an agreement between the creditor and debtor that
the surety shall not be discharged : Id.
The reservation must appear on the agreement ; it cannot be shown
by parol evidence: Id.
The endorser not being a party to the agreement, he could pay the
note and sue the drawer: Id.
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The extension of time to the drawer so that the rights of the endorser
are preserved will not discharge him: Pd.
Taking after Matnrity-&t-Off.-When a note passes after maturity
it is dishonored paper and the endorsee takes it subject to equities connected with the note; but not to set-off generally : Long v. .Rhawn, 75
Pa.
In a suit by an epdorsee against the maker of a note passed after
. maturity, Ilold, that the fact that the note was made with the understanding that it was to be discounted for the payee and taken up by him
*and the proceeds paid in discharge of a debt due to the maker ;-that
the proceeds were so paid, that the payee took it up and retained it and
passed it to the plaintiff in consideration of a loan made by her to him,
would be a defence to the suit: . l.
BOND.

Penalty-.iquldatedDamages.-Bigony gave to Tyson a bond in
$1000 conditioned that Bigony should not "practise medicine within
five miles of S., in which place he has this day deeded certain property
Held, that on the face of the bond the sum was a
to said Tyson."
penalty and not liquidated damages: Bigony v. Tyson, 75 Pa.
The intention of the parties gathered extra the instrument may fix
the sum named in it as liquidated damages, and the facts and circumstances so gathered being parol, the question is for the jury: Id.
Circumstances in this case from which the intention that the sum was
liquidated damages might be inferred : Id.
-

CHosE IN ACTION.
CONFEDERATE STATES.

See Gift.

See Notice.

CONFISCATION ACT.

Proceedingsvnder-An information in r m under the fifth, sixth and
seventh sections of the Confiscation Act of July 17th 1862, for the
confiscation of the real estate of ii person falling within the provisions of
those sections--such information not being in any sense a criminal proceeding-is not, after default made and entered, and after a final judgment
of condemnation, to be held fatally defective because it has averred that
the property seized belonged to some one who was one or another of the
persons referred to in the fifth and sixth sections of the act (thus making its allegation in the alternative), and has not averred it otherwise:
The Confiscation Cases. Slidell's Land, 20 Wall.
When an intormation avers that on a day named a seizure was made
by the marshal, under written authority given him by the district attorney, in compliance with instructions issued 'to him by the Attorney-General of' the United States, by virtue of the Act of Congress of July 17th
1862 (the Confiscation Act above mentioned); and when, to a citation
or monition founded on the information, defhult has been made, it will,
after such final judgment and condemnation, be presumed that the
requirements of the statute (which direct apparently that a seizure be
made prior to filing the information, and that this seizure be by order
of the President of the United States) have been complied with: Id.
When an information under the said act, filed in the District Court,
is really in common-law form, and the proceeding has the substance and
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all the requisites of a common-law proceeding, the fact that the information is entitled "a libel" of information, and that the warrant, and
citation is called a "monition," does not convert it into a proceeding on
the admiralty side of the court: Id.
What amounts to a sufficient service of process under the said act:
The fact that the warrant, citation and monition in the District Court
was not signed by the clerk of the court is unimportant, it having been
attested by the judge, sealed with the seal of the court, and signed by
the deputy clerk: Id.
Where, on an information under the said act, the information alleging
that the property belongs to A., and that it is liable to forfeiture under
the act-all allegations being in form--the court has proceeded, as the
act directs it to do after default, to hear and determine the case, and,
only after such hearing and consideration, condemns the property, it
must. be presumed that the property belonged to a person engaged in the
rebellion, or one who had given aid and comfort thereto : Id.
The President's proclamations of amnesty in the year 1868 did not
amount to a repeal of the Confiscation Act: d.
Holders of Liens against Real Estate sold under-Holders of liens
against real estate sold under the Confiscation Act of July 17th 1862,
should not be permitted to intervene in any proceedings for the confiscation. Their liens will not, in any event, be divested: Confiscation
Cses. Claims of Marcuardet al., 20 Wall.
Practice under.-When, under the Confiscation Act of July 17th
1862, an information has been filed in the District Court and a decree
of coddemnation and sale of the land seized been made, and the money
has been paid into the registry of the court, and on error to the Circuit
Court, that court, reversing the decree, has dismissed the information
but confirmed the sale, and ordered the proceeds to be paid to the owner
of the land-if on -error by the United States to this court, this court
reverse the decree of the Circuit Court, and affirm the decree of the
District Court, that reversal will leave nothing on which a writ of error
by the owner can act. The judgment having been reversed, the confirmation of the sale and order to pay the proceeds fhll. The only
judgment can be reversal again: Confiscation, Cases. Conrad's Lots,
20 Wall.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See Domicil.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Change of Constitution-Power of Convention subordinate to the
Law under which it is called.-An existing lawful government of the
people cannot be altered or abolished unless by their consent legally
obtained: lls et al. v. Bain et al., 75 Pa.
The Bill of Rights embraces but three recognised modes by which
the people of the state can give their consent to altering an existing
constitution. (1.) The mode provided in the Constitution. (2.) A law
raising a body tbr revision and giving it the powers of the people. (3.)
Revolution : Id.
A law is the only means by which an authorized consent of the people
can be lawfully obtained in a state of peace; irregular action, by which
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a certin number of the people assume to act for the whole, is revolutionary: 1d.
The authority of part to speak for the whole is only when it is at an
election authorized by law : Id.
The Act of June 2d 1871, submitted to the people the question of
calling a convention to amend the Constitution, to be held subject to
the laws relating to the general election; the vote was in thvor of calling
such convention. ' This vote only authorized the calling a convention ;it was not a mandate on the legislature to make the call : I(l.
The Act of April 11th 1872, -authorized the election of delegates,
and gave them power to propose a new Constitution or amendments, and
authorized one-third of the members of the convention to require a
separate vote on any amendment; it required the convention to submit
the amendments to the voters at such time "and in such wanner as the
convention shall prescribe," and that the election to decide upon the
amendments should "be conducted as the general elections now are."
By the election laws, the election in Philadelphia was to be conducted
by inspectors, &c. The convention, by an ordinance, appointed persons
named, to have direction of the election, to fill vacancies, to appoint
judges and inspectors, to make report of their action to the president
or the convention, &c. Ield, that this ordinance being contrary to the
Act of 1872, was void : Id.
The power of the convention to act for the people was derived from
the Act of 1872, and they had no other authority : Td.
Whether one-third of the members of the convention requested a
separate submission of an amendment, and whether the request was in
an orderly way, was for the convention to decide, and could not after
their'action be inquired into: Id.
Errors of procedure in the convention cannot be inquired into-the
convention having acted within the scope of its powers: Id.
Powers of onvention to amend the Constituton.-The constitutional
convention of 1873 had no inherent rights; it had powers only: Moods's
Appeal, 75 Pa.
The Bill of Rights is a reservation of rights out of the general powers
to the people themselves, not a delegation of powers to a convention : M.
The convention was under the rule, that no agent or subordinate can
claim the powers, liberties or franchises of the people except by their
express grant or by plain and certain implication : Jd.
The people had the same right to limit the powers of their delegates
as to bound the powers of their representatives : 1I.
The legislature cannot confer powers inconsistent with the rights,
safety and liberties of the people, because no consent can be implied,
but they may pass limitations in favor of their essential rights : Id.
The convention called under the Acts of 1871 and 1872 could not
take fromi the people their sovereign right to ratify or reject the constitution or ordinance formed by it, and could not infuse life or vigor into
its work before ratification by the people : .2d.
Power of Taxation-Agreenent of State to Surrender.-A contract
by a state to give up its power to tax any property within it, can be
made only by words which show clearly and unequivocally an intention
to make such a contract: North l[issouri Railroad Co. v. Maguire, 20
Wall.
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The Act of the Legislature of Missouri of February 16th 1865, to
provine fubr the completion of the North Missouri Railroad, does not
so show an intention of the state to give up its power to tax the property of the corporation owning that railroad : Id.
The ordinance of the 8th of April 1865, adopted by the people of
lissouri, as part of the Constitution of the state established on that
day, was, as respected the North Missouri Railroad Company, a true
exercise of the taxing power of the state, and not a mere change of the
order of disbursing the receipts of the earnings of the company as prescribed by the Act of Legislature above named : L.
Pocwer of Taxation-Agreement of State to Surrender.-The twelfth
section of the Act of the Missouri legislature, passed December 25th
1852, by which it was declared that" The Pacific Railroad shall be exempt from taxation until the same
shall be completed, opened, and in operation, anu shall declare a dividend. when the road-bed, buildings, machinery, engines, cars, and other
property of such completed road, shall be subject to taxation at the
actual cash value thereof:"P ro, ided, That if said company shall fail, for the period of two years
after said roads respectively shall be completed and put in operation, to
declare a dividend, that then said company shall no longer be exempt
from the payment of said tax-"
created a contract that, subject to the proviso, the railroad should not
be taxed : Pacific Railroad 0o v. Afyvire, 20 Wall.
The ordinance adopted as part of the state constitution by the people
of Missouri. July 4th 1865. levying a tax on the gross receipts of the
company, within two years after it was completed and put in operation,
in order to pay debts of' the state, contracted in order to help to
build the road (and which the railroad company was, as between itself
and the state, primarily bound to pay), impaired the obligation of the
contract, and was void: 1.
CONTRACT.
Prevention of Performance-Damages.-Wherea person, on a given
contract, covenants to pay a sum whose amount is to be contingent on
certain events and is to be ascertained by arbitrators, such person, if he
prevent any arbitration, may be sued at law on a quantun valebat, and
the sum due may be ascertained by a jury under instructions from the
court. If the jury, under such instructions, find that only so much is
due, the plaintiff can recover nothing more : Hurnaston v. Telegraph
Companly, 20 Wall.
A contract of a special nature explained and interpreted so as to sustain a charge under which, in a case like that just stated, the jury found
as due much less than the plaintiff claimed : Id.
Where a person in consideration of property (not money) to be assigned by another, agrees to give a certain number of shares of stock,
having on the day of the contract a fixed market value, and, refusing to
give the stock, is sued-at law for a breach of the contract, evidence of
the value of the stock at any other time than at the date of the contract is rightly excluded; its value at that date being agreed on and
admitted: Id.
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Restraint of Trade-Public Polic.-Questions about contracts in
restraint of trade must be judged according to the circumstances on
which they arise, and in subservience to the general rule that there must
be no injury to the public by its being deprived of the restricted party's
industry, and that the party himself must not be precluded from pursuing his occupation and thus prevented from supporting himself and
his fimily. Accordingly, where A., enga'-ed in navigating waters of
California alone, sold in 1864 a steamer to B., engaged in navigating a
particular river (the Columbia river) of Oregon and Washington territQries (regions to the north of California), subject to a stipulation that
he, B., would not employ it or suffer it to be employed for ten years from
the date of the sale, in any waters of California, and B., three years
afterwards-i. e., in 1867-sold the same steamer to C., engaged in
navigating Puget's Sound (water in the extreme north-west corner of
Washington Territory and remote from all the other waters described),
subject to a stipulation that she should not be run or employed upon any
of the routes of travel, or the rivers, bays or waters or' the state of California, or the Columbia river and its tributaries, for the period of ten
years from May 1st 1867. Held, that the contract was not void as in
restraint of trade: Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall.
Iebl, further-the contract in the second ease having been for ten
years from the date of it, and therefore for three years after the first
contract had expired-that it was so divisible in regard to the California
portion that it could stand for the seven years for which B. was bound
to protect it, though it was void as to the remaining three, and accordingly that B. could sue for a breach of it occurring within the first seven
years of it; that is to say, occurring within the time that he was to
protect A. i d.
Conveyance of Land on Condition by Grantee to usefor Special Purpose- Compliance by Grantee-Railroad Company.-The owner of a
piece of -land agreed in writing to convey it to a railroad company for
-depot purposes, on condition it should be occupied for the western part
of the company's depot-grounds and a part of the usual depot-buildings
be erected thereon. It was then expected that the other part of the
depot-grounds and buildings would be located across a street adjoining
the ground to be conveyed on the east, but nothing was said in the
agreement about the location of the eastern part of the depot-grounds
and buildings. The company cause4 to be erected and sustained on said
piece of ground a warehouse for the accommodation of the public in
doing business on the road, and constructed thereon facilities for loading
and unloading live-stock, coal and lumber; but erected the principal
depot-buildings forty rods east of said piece of land. Held, that the company had complied with the condition of the agrement, and was entitled.
to hold the land: Pittsburgh,F. W. & C. Railway Co. v. Rose et al.,
24 Ohio St.
See Evidence.
1Fb2yery.-A count in an indictment that charges that respondent did
falsely make and counterfeit a certain writing therein set forth, is not
liable to the objection of duplicity: State v. Hastings, 53 N. H.
An averment, in an indictment for forgery, of an intent to defraud
one J. A. 11., is sustained by proof of an intent to defraud a company
CRIMINAL LAw.
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or firm of which said J. A. H. is a member. An intent to defraud a
firm, necessarily includes an intent to defraud each member of it: Rd.
DAM1AGES.

See Contract.

Vinditive.-In a civil action founded upon a tort, punishable by the
criminal law, an amount of damages equal to the full compensation of
the plaintiff for the injury sustained by him cannot be increased by the
addition of a fine for the punishment of the defendant ? Pay et ux. v.

Parker,53 N. H.
Whether, in any civil action, the plaintiff may recover exemplary,
punitory or vindictive damages, qua-re: Id.
Assessment by the Court-Practice-RelevinBond.-The 71st section
of the Practice Act, (Nix. Dig. 729), which makes it the duty of the
court to assess damages on interlocutory judgment by defhult, unless a
writ of inquiry is requested, applies only to actions of assumpsit : Peacock v. Haney et al., 8 Vroom.
Independently of the statute, in actions of assunpsit, debt and covenant, the practice is to assess damages by the court, without a writ of
inquiry, where the amount of damages is a mere matter of computation.
But where the daniages are for an uncertain sum, to be ascertained on
the hearing of testimony, and the exercise of judgment upon the effect
of proof, they must, in cases not within the statute, be determined by writ
of inquiry: Id.
In an action on a replevin bond, the plaintiff is entitled to recover as
damages the value of the goods, and, as a general rule, interest thereon
from the judgment of a return, together with the costs taxed in the
original action. The damages in such cases cannkot be assessed by the
court, but must be ascertained by a writ of inquiry : Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Husband and Wife; Pleading.
DEED.

Misreading-Avoidig in Law and Eguity- Capacity of Grantor.If a deed be read falsely to a man too infirm to read it himself, or if
the contents be untruly stated to him, it may for that reason be avoided
at law; but if he be simply misinformed as to its legal effect, it cannot
be avoided in a court of law, but a court of equity will correct or reform
the deed: Eaton v. Eaton, 8 Vroom.
The degree of evidence required to defeat such deed should be sufficient to carry strong conviction to the minds of the jury of' its truth:
Id.
The test of capacity to make a deed is, that a person should have the
capacity to understand the nature and effect of the act in which he is
engaged, and the business he is transacting: Id.
The deed of conveyance of a person of unsound mind, executed
before an inquisition and finding of lunacy, if taken in good faith, is
voidable only and not void: Id.
A. voidable deed may be ratified by acts of acquiescence after the
disability is removed ; b'ut the acts of confirmation to establish the deed
must show an intention to confirm it with knowledge of its character
and that it is voidable : id.
VOL. XXIII.-16
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DoMuICIL.
Fact and Intention as parts f--The domicil is where a person has
fixed his habitation widhout a present intention to remove from it:
Carey's Appel, 75 Pa.
To con.titute domicil there must be both residence and an intention to
make the place of residence the home of the party: Id.
Prima faie the residence is the domicil : Md.
The intention formed and announced to change a domicil, will not
avail unless there be an actu'l change of habitation: Mi.
In this case a testator made a will in Pennsylvania witnessed by two
witnesses ;-the evidence showing that his domicil was in Rhode Island
where three witnesses are required, on appeal to the Supreme Court,
probate of the Pennsylvania will by the register in Philadelphia was
revoked and letters testamentary vacated : d.
EQuITY.
EVIDENCE.

See Notice.

See Officer; Street.

Criminal Law-Fominer Acts of same kind.-Evidence that the defendant, the keeper of the Sherman House, kept spirituous liquor for
sale there, at a certain date, has a tendency to prove that the defendant,
still keeping the Sherman House, kept spirituous liquor for sale there at
a later date: State v. Colston, 53 N. H.
Experts-comparison of Hands.-Experts may make comparisons
between the writing in dispute and other writings, which are either
admitted or proved to be genuine,.and their opinions thus formed in
regard to the genuineness of the writing in question may be given in
evidence. "In such eases the jury should first pass upon the question
whether such writings as were thus introduced as standards of comparison were genuine; and if they find that they were, then they should
consider and weigh the evidence of such experts, and may themselves
examine such other writings and compare them with that in dispute,
and institute comparisons for themselves; but if they find that such
writings or any of them were not genuine, they should lay such writings
and all the evidence based upon them out of the case: State v. Bastings, 53 N. H.
FRAUD. See Deed; Partnership.
iritten Assignment of 1'odicy of Insurance not delivered-Seal.Trough effected a life-insurance, being solvent :-in consideration of $1
and love and affection for his children he executed under seal an assignment of the policy to Hicks in trust for them ; put the policy and assignment into an envelope, addressed "John W. Hicks, Plumber, 2d St.,
&c.-Please send this to him at my death, H. Trough," and placed the
envelope in a safe of his own firin. Ie paid the premiums till his death
seven years after the assigninent;-but never communicated the transaction to Hicks, who knew nothing of it till after his death. Held, that
the assignment was invalid for want of delivery, and the proceeds belonged to Trough's estate: Trough's Estate, 75 Pa.
A gift of a chose in action or chattel cannot be made by words in
futuro or words inpraesenti unaccompanied by delivery: Id.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

Where the ddnor retains the control of a voluntary bond or chose in
action given or assigned, he may cancel or destroy it: Id.
If the determining apt be in fieri the intention to deliver does not execute the gift: M.
The assignment being without valuable consideration was not a contract or trust which could be enforced : Id.
A seal does not import a consideration, if the instrument be not delivered : Id.
Failtire to deliver in Giver's Lifetime.-Streeper held a bond against
Zimmerman ; he endorsed on it, " I request my executors to give this
bond to Anna for her great kindness she has shown to me and lier -,Tmdmother," this was signed and sealed : after it was written, "This is not
to interfere with what I will to her, this she is to have beside that."
Anna was the granddaughter of the obligee and the wife of the obligor.
The bond was not delivered to Anna but remained in the obligor's possession with his other securities till his death. Iih, that the bond did
not pass to Anna: Zimmerman v. Streeper et al., 75 Pa.
The endorsement indicated a prospective gift; there being no delivery
Id.
it was without operation :
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Pleading; Vendor.
Separation- ovenant to Pay-Reconiciliaton-l
Voluntary Settlement.-A deed by which a husband, on articles of separation between
him and his wife, binds himself to pay, in trust for her, a certain amount
of money (capital), and interest on it till paid, becomes a voluntary
settlement if,before payment is made, the parties are reconciled, make
null all the covenants of the articles of separation, and cohabit again,
with an agreement that the settlement shall stand as agreed on, except
that the husband shall not pay interest while he and his wife live
together: Kehr v. Smith, 20 Wall.
A voluntary settlement of $7000 cannot be sustained against creditors
where the person owes $9306, and has, of all sorts of property, the same
being not cash, not more than $16,132: Li.
JUDGMENT.
LACHES.
LANDLO *

See Pleading.
See Notice.
AND TENANT.

Lease-ncidents to.-By the lease of a building. everything which
belongs to it, or is used with it, and which is reasonably essential to its
enjoyment, passes as incident to the principal thing and as a part of it,
unless especially reserved : Riddle v. Littlefield et al., 53 N. 1H.
A. leased to B. "a certain store * * known as No. 191 Elm street ;"
-held, that by the terms of the lease B. acquired the right to the use
of the outside walls of the building, for the purpose of posting bills and
notices thereon ; and that A. could not convey this incident right to a
third person: Id.
LTASE.

See Landlord and Tenant.
LUNATIC.

See Deed.
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MANDAMUS.

117ot alpjroprwatc to enforce Payment of Debt.-A mandamus is not
the proper remedy whereby to enforce payment of moneys due from a
municipai corporation fir work and labor: The State ex rel. Little v.
Township O jmnittee of Uhion Township, 8 Vroom.
MARRIED WOMEN.

See Husband antl Wife; Pleadinq.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

See Mandamus.

NEGLIaENCE.
Inju3I by Railroad Company to Child of Thirteen ]ears.-As a
general rule a question of negligence is for the jury, especially if there
be substantial doubt as to the facts'or their inferences: Crissey v.
Hestonville Railway ao., 75 Pa.
Negligence is dependent upon the circumstances of the case; and is
for the jury where the measure of duty is not unvarying: a higher
degree of care is demanded in some cases than in others, and both the
duty and its extent are to be ascertained by facts : Id.
Where negligence is concurrent a child will not be held to the same
degree of care as an adult : Id.
The plaintiff thirteen years of age, with a companion of same age,
signalled a street car, got on the front platform ]without objection from
the driver or conductor, and paid their fare. After riding fbr a considerable distance, plaintiff said he was going, to get off, the driver
"slacked up," but did not stop; in getting off plaintiff was injured.
Whether he had been guilty of negligence was for the jury: 11d.
Whether permitting the plaintiff to stand on 'the front platform and
get off from it were negligence, and proper care was exercised in not
stopping the car sooner, was for the jury: Id.
It is the duty of a railway company to cause its cars to come to a full
stop for passengers to get off: Id.
NOTICE.
Absence in the Service of Rebellion-Ni~otice of Suit by PublicationLaches.-A man who has neglected his private affairs and gone away
from his home and state, for the purpose of devoting his time to the
cause of rebellion against the government, cannot come into equity to
complain that his creditors have obtaied payment of admitted debts
through judicial process obtained upon constructive notice, and on a
supposition wrongly made by them that he had no home in the state, or
none that they knew of: .MeQuiddyv. Wore, 20 Wall.
Especially. is this true when there is no allegation of want of actual
knowledge of what they were doing: Id.
And still more especially true is it in Missouri, where the statutes of
the state allow a bill of review of decrees or judgments obtained on constructive notice at any time within three years after they are obtained,
and the complainant has let more than six years pass without an effort
to have them so reviewed : JR.
Allegations of general ignorance of things a knowledge of which is
easily ascertainable, is insufficient to set into action the remedies of
equity: Id.
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OFFICER.

Evidence of Appointment-Commission by Governor.-The Act of
April 12th 1867, for protection of person, &c., in mining regions is constitutional, so far as it provides for appointing police officers and paying
the compensation fixed by the governor out of the county treasury
.NorthumberlandCounty v. Zimmerm, n, 75 Pa.
The act requires, that the governor may appoint such officers on the
petition of one hundred citizens in the region, &c. Ield, that a copy
of such petition, &c., certified by the secretary of the Commonwealth.
with the commission to the officer, was evidence of the appointment : 11.
Certified copies of all records, &c., in the secretary's office are evidence wherever the original would be : Id.
The governor is authorized to commission all officers whose election or
appointment is provided by law, and his commission is the proper evidence of election or appointment: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Appropriation of Firm Property by one Partnerfor his own DebtFraud-Presumption.-Anappropriation of partnership assets by one
partner without the assent of his copartners, in satisfaction or security
of his private debt, in the absence of proof to the contrary is presumed
to be fraudulent and collusive, as against the other members of the
firm, and may by them be set aside. This presumption, however, is not
conclusive, but may be rebutted: Corwin v. Snydam, 24 Ohio St.
Where the sole acting member of a dissolved partnership, with full
power to dispose of its property and pay its debts, himself became a
creditor of the firm, by advancing his private funds in payment of its
debts, and then in good faith and with no intention to defraud the company, disposed of the property of the firm to an amount leis than the
sum so due him. in satisfaction of a debt due from him to a third person,
who received the same in like good faith, and in the belief that such
sale was authorized by the firm : teld, that this disphsition of the
property cannot be avoided by another member of the firm, it appearing
that all the outside debts of the firm are paid or seeured, and that there
is nothing due to such other member from the firm, unless lie includes
in his account against it a part of the same claim of A. upon the firm,
transferred by A. to him in satisfaction of a debt due to him friom A.
Id.
Receipt of Part of Profits-ot Gonclusive.-An agreement by
which a person is to have a share of the profits of a business, is competent evidence on the question of his liability as a partner in that business; but sharing profits, in any other sense than sharing them as a
principal, is not an absolute legal test of his liability: Eastman v.
Clark, 53 N. H.
The question of his liability, is the question whether he is a principal
bound by a contract made by himself, or his agent acting by his authority, or whether he is estopped to deny that lie is a principal within the
general doctrine of estoppel : -d.
PLEADING.

Joinderof Plaintiffs claiming in different Rights, but for same Cause
of Action.-Two or more of the several owners of lots assessed for a
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street improvement, claiming the assessment to be, for the same reason,
invalid as to each, may properly join in an action to restrain the collection of the assessment; and when the parties thus similarly interested
in the question are numerous, one may sue on! behalf of himself and all
others whom lie is authorized to represent, and who might otherwise rightfully join in tile action: Uphgton, &c., v. Oviutt, Treasurer,
24 Ohio St.
Necessary Partiesto the Issue-Set-off-Assiqrnment of Judgment.In a,, action by the assignees of -a judgment, against the debtor and
others, to subject equities to the satisfaction of the judgment, the judginerit-debtor set up in his answer, by way of set-off, an indebtedness to
him from the judgment-creditor accruing before the assignment to the
plaintiff. JMdd, that the judgment-creditor was a necessary party to the
issue thus tendered by tile defendant in his answer. And gumreWhether in such case, in order to constitute an equitable set-off, an allegation of the insolvency of the judgment-creditor, or other circumstance of equitable cognisance, is not necessary?: Gildersleeve et al. v.
Burrows et al., 24 Ohio St.
Act ion by Fenze Covert withoutjoining the Husbafid-Narr.should set
forth the (ircunmstances giving her the Right to sue alone.-A party
who is sued by a married woman, who declares as if she were afeme
sole, in a case where she has no right thus to sue, may take advantage
of the defect by plea in abatement, and the plaintiff must reply the facts
which enable her to sue alone: Dutton et al. v. Rice et al., 53 N. H.
The rule of pleading, by which the burden of allegation of facts
enabling afeme covert to sue alone is thus cast upon her, seems, in the
present condition of statutory law in this state, to be more convenient
and reasonaljle than a rule which should impose upon the defendant, in
pleading, a denial of all the possible conditions in which the suit might
be Iaintained, notwithstanding the coverture: Id.
To a declaration in assumpsit by afeme covert, the defendants pleaded
in abatement the non-joinder of the plaintiff's husband. Upon demurrer
to the plea-Ield,that the demurrer imported into the plaintiff's declaration the fact of coverture admitted thereby, and so the declaration
was insufficient, inasmuch as it contained no statement of any circunistances indicating her right to sue without joining her husband in the
action ; but the plaintiff was permitted to withdraw her demurrer, and
by replication set out such facts as might enable her to maintain the
suit: Id.
PRACTIcE. See Damages; W|itness.
RAILROAD.

See Contract; Negligence.

RECEIVER.
Nature of his Title-Suit by-Set-off against him.-A receiver has
no legal title to the assets of the estate and cannot maintain trover for
them without leave of the court, except after they have actually passed
into his possession : Singerly v. Fox, 75 Pa.
By leave of the court a receiver of a firm which was lessee, sold goods
on the premises to the landlord; in an action for the price by the receiver the landlord c ,uld not set off rent due him: Id.
The receiver could maintain the suit in his own name without the
order of the court : Id.
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The landlord had o right to have his rent from the proceeds of sale,
as in case of an execution under the Act of June 13th 18:36, sects. 83,
84 : Il.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.

Jurisdlction of Civil Courts o'er-Prhcipleson which such Courts
intercene.-Oivil courts, in determining the question of legitimate succession of an unincorporated religious society, where a separation has
taken place, will adopt its rules, and entrce its polity in the spirit and
to the effect for which it was designed: Harrisonet al. v. Ilonylc et at.,
24 Ohio St.
Where public policy, or the positive law of the land, is not contran
vened, the decisions and orders of such society, when made in conformity
to its polity, should have the same effect, in civil courts, which the
society intended should be awarded to them when pronounced by its own
judicatories : lvI.
If such society be composed of several bodies or branches, whether
co-ordinate or subordinated, the rules or the society, fir the management of its internal affairs, and for the adjustment of the relations between its branches, constitute the rule by which they should be governed : Id.
REPLEVIN. See Damages.
SEAL.

See Gift.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

See Fndor.

STREET.

Map or Plan-De(dicntion to Public Use-Damages for Opening.The adoption of a map or plan by conmissioners appointed by the legislature, or under legislative authority, by conveying or bounding with
reference thereto, is a dedication of the lands of the owner within the
lines of the street laid down on said map, and referred to in the convevance : Clark v. City of Elizabeth, 8 Vrom.
On opening the street no assessment of damages will be made to such
landowner: Id.
The deed is the best evidence of dedication, and parol evidence will
not be admitted to contradict it, and show there was no intention to
dedicate: Id.
TAXATION.

See ConstitutionalLaw.

TORT.
Joint and Separate Liability -When two or more persons, though
not acting in concert, occasion an injury, they are severally liable for
the consequences : Newman v. Fowler. 8 Vroom.
Where a house was badly built in consequence of the joint neglect
of the'architect and the contractor, a suit founded on such neglect, will
lie against the architect alone : P.
Nor will the fact that the owner of the house refused to pay the contractor a part of the inoney due to the contractor on the ground that
the house is badly built, bar such suit : Md.
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VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

SPecific Performance-Refusal of Wife to join in Deed.-A purchaser is entitled to have a contract for sale of land specifically executed
so far as thc vendor can, and to have an abatement from the purchasemoney for any deficiency in the title, quantity or other matter touching
the estate : Burk's Appeal, 75 Pa.
A husband contracted to sell land, the wife refused to join in the deed,
there being no collusion with her husband. Held, that the vendee
could not compel specific execution by the husband alone and retain
part of the purchase-money as indemnity against the wife's contingent
el/in for dower: Id.
A purchaser frou a husband takes the risk of the wife joining in the
deed or his action against the husband for damages: Id.
Specific execution of an agreement to sell land will not be decreed
against a vendor, a married man whose wife !refuses to join in the deed,
unless the vendee be willing to pay the full purchase-money and accept
the deed without the wife: Id.
The purchaser having proposed in open court to accept a deed from
the vendor alone and pay the purchase-money, the case was remitted
that the court below might make such decree : Id.
WATERS.

Right of Fishigin Tide- Waters-State Grant-JointAction- Confusion of Goods.-The right of fishing and'taking oysters in the tidal
waters of this state is prina facie common to all the people of this state.
But the legislature may grant a right of enjoyment in lands under tidewaters to private individuals for the purpose of fishing and planting
oysters. to the exclusion of the public right therein: Wooley v. Campbell et el., 8 Vroom.
Several lessees under the act entitled Ail act to authorize the planting of oysters on lands covered with water in Shark river, and for the
protection of the same" (Acts 1861, p. 436), may, by agreement, use
jointly the lands which have been granted to them severally for the
purpose of planting oysters; and in such case, having a joint property
in the oysters planted, may join in an action to recover damages for taking
their joint property : Id.
The doctrine that one mixing his goods with those of another, so that
a separation is impossible, loses his property, is a doctrine that is adopted
to prevent fraud, and is not applied except in favor of an innocent party
against a wrongdoer. A person who is himself a wrongdoer is not entitled to the benefit of this principle : 1d.
WITNESS.

Privilege from Service of Process.-A party to a suit in chancery,
who resides in another state, and comes into this state to give testimony
in his own behalf before a laster in Chancery, is, while necessarily
attending before the master and going to and returning from the place
where such examination is held, privileged from the service of a summons in a civil cause, without any subpoena ad testificandum being
served: Dungan ads. .Miller, 8 Vroom.

